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In this paper, we use a general equilibrium overlapping generations monetary endogenous growth
model of a small open economy, to analyze whether ¯nancial repression, measured via the \high"
mandatory reserve-deposit requirements of ¯nancial intermediaries, is an optimal response of a
consolidated government following an increase in the degree of currency substitution. We ¯nd
that higher currency substitution can yield higher reserve requirements, but, the result depends
crucially on how the consumer weighs money in the utility function relative to domestic and
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11 Introduction
Using a general equilibrium overlapping generations monetary endogenous growth model of small open
economy, we analyze the relationship between currency substitution and ¯nancial repression. We follow
Drazen (1989), Bacchetta and Caminal (1992), Haslag and Hein (1995), Espinosa and Yip (1996), Haslag
(1998), Haslag and Koo (1999), Haslag and Bhattacharya (2001) and Gupta (2005, 2006, 2007) amongst
others, in de¯ning ¯nancial repression through an obligatory \high" reserve deposit ratio requirement, that
the banks in the economy needs to maintain. In other words, the study attempts to assay whether there
exists a plausible explanation as to why the reserve requirements in some economies are higher than others.
Speci¯cally, we analyze whether the \high" reserve requirements in a small open economy characterized by
currency substitution, are a fall out of a welfare maximizing decision of the government, having access to
income taxation and seigniorage as sources of revenue.
The motivation for believing that currency substitution can be a possible rationale for ¯nancial repression,
can be outlined as follows: In a small open economy, in°ation often leads to currency substitution, which,
in turn, tends produce a negative impact on the revenue raised by the government via seigniorage. In
such a back drop, our paper analyzes whether increasing the reserve requirements, our metric for ¯nancial
repression, could be identi¯ed as an welfare-maximizing response of the government. This is simply because,
the increase in reserve requirements would tend to recuperate the fall in the size of the seigniorage base, that
results from substitution of the domestic currency.
Note, ¯nancial repression can be broadly de¯ned as a set of government legal restrictions, like interest
rate ceilings, compulsory credit allocation and high reserve requirements, that generally prevent the ¯nancial
intermediaries from functioning at their full capacity level. However, given the wave of interest rate dereg-
ulation in the 1980s, and removal credit ceiling some years earlier, the major form of ¯nancial repression is
currently via obligatory reserve requirements.1 As Espinosa and Yip (1996) points out the concern is not
whether ¯nancial repression is prevelent, but the associated degree to which an economy is repressed, since
developed or developing economies both resort to such restrictive policies.
Now the pertinent question here is - Why, if at all, would a government want to repress the ¯nancial
1See Caprio et al. (2001) for further details.
2system ? This seems paradoxical, especially when one takes into account the well documented importance of
the ¯nancial intermediation process on economic activity, mainly via the ¯nance-growth nexus.2 Besides, the
fact that \high" cash reserve requirements enhances the size of the implicit tax base and, hence, is lucrative
for the government to repress the ¯nancial system, an alternative line of thought is derived from the works
of Cukierman et al.(1992) and Giovannini and De Melo (1993). Both these studies suggested that, countries
with ine±cient tax systems would be more oriented towards the repression of the ¯nancial sector. Roubini
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) addresses this issue in a formal fashion, using an endogenous growth framework.
They indicated that, governments subjected to large tax-evasion will \choose to increase seigniorage by
repressing the ¯nancial sector and increasing the in°ation rates."
However, Gupta (2005, 2006), using a pure-exchange- and a production-economy, respectively, in an
overlapping generations framework, showed that higher tax evasion would cause a benevolent social planner
to optimally increase the tax rates, when implicit taxation is also available as a source of revenue. The
optimal reserve requirements, however, continues to be at zero, implying the inability of tax evasion to explain
¯nancial repression. But, in a di®erent study, Gupta (2007), when allowed tax evasion to be determined
endogenously, showed that higher degree of tax evasion within a country, resulting from a higher level
of corruption and a lower penalty rate, yields higher degrees of ¯nancial repression as a social optimum.
However, a higher degree of tax evasion due to a lower tax rate, results in an increase in the severity of
¯nancial restriction.
But, Basu (2001) using a monetary endogenous growth model with productive public capital ¯nanced
through seigniorage, indicates that the growth- and welfare-maximizing reserve requirement can deviate from
zero. Di Giorgio (1999), on the other hand, suggested that the level of reserve requirements are related to
the degree of ¯nancial development. The author studied a simple productive economy with the process of
¯nancial intermediation characterized by a costly state veri¯cation problem. As a regulatory policy, the
banks are obligated to maintain mandatory reserve requirement on deposits. The analysis indicated that
when the cost of monitoring is negligible, the optimal reserve ratio tends to zero. However, beyond a critical
level of monitoring cost, the optimal reserve requirement will be di®erent from zero. Furthermore, the
2See Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and the references cited there in.
3optimal reserve requirement was shown to be strictly increasing in the costs of veri¯cation of the state. This
result highlighted the fact that ¯nancially developed economies, which are more likely to have low costs
associated with the activities of the ¯nancial intermediaries are more prone to have lower optimal reserve
requirements than economies with lesser e±cient ¯nancial systems.
Other attempts to rationalize ¯nancial repression has tended to rely on imperfect information and the
possibility of banking crisis, for example, the two studies by Gupta (2005, 2006) stated above, when discussing
the role of tax evasion and ¯nancial repression. Gupta (2005), using an overlapping generations production-
economy-monetary model characterized by possibility of banking crisis, shows that economies with higher
probability of banking crisis should optimally choose higher income taxation. The correlation between
optimal reserve requirements and probability of crisis is positive only when the social planner has exhausted
its ability to use income taxation. Similar results were also found by Gupta (2006), based on a a pure-
exchange overlapping generations model, characterized by information asymmetry between the government
and the ¯nancial intermediaries. The author showed that a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare
and simultaneously ¯nancing the budget constraint, would optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit
taxation.
As can be seen from the above discussion, the attempts to explain the existence of ¯nancial repression
has had a varied degree of success, and has covered the areas of tax evasion, ¯nancial development, and,
more recently, information asymmetry and bank failures. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the
¯rst study to use currency substitution as a rationale for ¯nancial repression. Overall, from a public ¯nance
perspective, our study can also be viewed as analyzing optimal policy decisions within a small open economy
with currency substitution. In this regard, we extend the recent paper of Holman and Neanidis (2006), by
allowing for an additional policy instrument, namely the reserve requirement, beside the income tax rate and
the money growth rate, as used in their study.3 Note these authors, studied the growth and welfare e®ects of
explicit and implicit tax rates in a small open economy characterized by currency substitution and and tax
3Interestingly, based on the International Financial Statistics of the IMF, the average reserve requirement for the 22 economies
considered by Holman and Neanidis (2006) was found to be 22.02 percent over the period of 1980 to 2006. Clearly, the ratio
was quite substantial, and cannot be ignored as a monetary policy instrument.
4evasion. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the economic environment
and Section 3 de¯nes the equilibrium. Section 4 derives the conditions under which ¯nancial repression and
currency substitution tends to be positively related as part of a welfare-maximizing outcome, while, Section
5 concludes and lays out the areas of further research.
2 Economic Environment
In this section, the overlapping generations model of Diamond (1965) is modi¯ed to depict a ¯nancially re-
pressed structure of a small open economy, characterized by currency substitution. The economy is populated
by four types of agents, namely, consumers, banks (¯nancial intermediaries), ¯rms and an in¯nitely-lived
government. The following subsections lays out the economic environment in detail, by considering each of
the agents separately and accounting for the external sector.
2.1 Consumers
The economy is characterized by an in¯nite sequence of two-period- lived overlapping generations of con-
sumers. Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1, 2,.... At each date t, there are two coexisting generations
{ young and old. N people are born at each time point t¸1. At t = 1, there exist N people in the economy,
called the initial old, who live for only one period. Hereafter N is normalized to 1.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of working time (nt) when young and is retired when old. The
agent supplies this one unit of labor inelastically and receives a competitively determined real wage of wt.
We assume that the agents consume only when old4 and, hence, the net of tax wage earnings are allocated
between bank deposits and domestic and foreign currencies. Money is held by the consumer because it
gives utility. The proceeds from the bank deposits are used to obtain second period consumption. The
consumption bundle comprises of a domestically produced good and an imported foreign good. We assume a
separable and additive log-utility function in the two goods and composite money. A notable feature of our
model is the lack of bonds of any type, either domestic or foreign. In a world of no uncertainty, incorporating
4This assumption has no bearing on the results of our model. It makes computations easier and also seems to be a good
approximation of the reality. For details see Hall (1988).
5bonds in either the consumer portfolio or the bank problem, the latter described in Subsection 2.2, would
imply multiplicity of optimal allocations of deposits (or loans) and bonds, since the \no arbitrage" conditions
would imply a relative price of one between deposits (or loans) with domestic and foreign bonds.
Formally, the agents problem born in period t is as follows:
U(ct+1;c¤
t+1;m1t;ft) = Ã1 logct+1 + Ã2 logc¤




ptdt + ptm1t + [etp¤
t]f¤
t · (1 ¡ ¿t)ptwt (2)
pt+1ct+1 + [et+1p¤
t+1]c¤
t+1 · [1 + idt+1]ptdt + ptm1t + [etp¤
t]f¤
t (3)
where U(¢) is the utility function, with the standard assumptions of positive and diminishing marginal
utilities in both goods and both currencies; Ã1, Ã2 and [1¡Ã1 ¡Ã2] are the weights the consumer assigns to
the domestic and foreign goods and the composite money in the utility function; ct+1 and c¤
t+1 are the old
age consumption of domestic and foreign goods, respectively; m1t and f¤
t and dt indicates, in real terms, the
consumer's holding of the the domestic and foreign currencies and deposits, respectively; ¸ (1¡¸) with 0 <
¸ < 1, captures the weight of domestic (foreign) currency in composite money; ¿t is the tax rate at period t;
wt is the real wage rate; pt (p¤
t), is the domestic (foreign) price at period t; et is the nominal exchange rate;
and, idt+1 is the nominal interest rate on bank deposits.


























(1 ¡ ¸)wt (7)
dt =
[(Ã1 + Ã2)(1 + idt+1) ¡ 1]
idt+1
(8)
We assume that the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) condition, p = ep¤ holds. Since p¤ is parametrically
given to the small-open economy, we set it to unity without any loss of generality. Hence, implying that the
domestic price level and the nominal exchange rates are synonymous for the model economy, with the PPP




pt = 1 + ¼t+1.
62.2 Financial Intermediaries
At the start of each period, the ¯nancial intermediaries accept deposits and make their portfolio decision
i.e., loans and cash reserves choices, with a goal of maximizing pro¯ts. At the end of the period, they receive
their interest income from the loans made and meets the interest obligations on the deposits. Note the inter-
mediaries are constrained by legal requirements on the choice of their portfolio (i.e., reserve requirements),
as well as by the feasibility requirement. Given such a structure, the intermediaries obtains the optimal
choice for lt by solving the following problem:
max
l;d
¼Bt = iltlt ¡ idtdt (9)
s. to.
m2t + lt 6 dt (10)
m2t ¸ °tdt (11)
where ¼Bt is the real pro¯t of the ¯nancial intermediary at time t; m2t and lt are, in real-terms, the cash
reserves held by the bank and the loans made, respectively; and, °t is the reserve-deposit ratio. The reserve
requirement ratio is the ratio of required reserves (which must be held in form of currency) to deposits.
To gain some economic intuition on the role of reserve requirements, our metric for ¯nancial repression,
let us consider the solution of the problem for a typical intermediary. Free entry, drives pro¯ts to zero and
we have:
ilt(1 ¡ °t) ¡ idt = 0 (12)





Reserve requirements, thus, tend to induce a wedge between the interest rate on savings and the lending
rate for the ¯nancial intermediary.
72.3 Firms
All ¯rms are identical and produces a single ¯nal good using a constant returns to scale, Cobb-Douglas-type,





where yt is the output; nt is the hours of labor supplied inelastically to production in period t; kt is the
per-¯rm capital stock in period t; kt denotes the aggregate capital stock in period t; A is a positive scalar,
and; 0 < ® < 1, is the elasticity of output with respect to capital. Following, Romer (1986), the aggregate
capital stock enters into the production function (15) to account for a positive externality indicating an
increase in labor productivity as the society accumulates capital stock. It must be noted that in equilibrium,
kt= kt.
At time t the ¯nal good can either be consumed or stored. Firms operate in a competitive environment
and maximize pro¯t taking the wage rate, the rental rate on capital and the price of the consumption good as
given, besides, kt. The producers use the available bank loans, lt, to purchase capital. This is because a ¯rm
starts each period with no cash, since free entry and exit in the perfectly competitive product market washes
out all pro¯ts. Notice that the production transformation schedule is linear so that the same technology
applies to both capital formation and the production of consumption goods, and, hence, both investment
and consumption goods sell for the same price pt.














pt¡1kt · pt¡1lt¡1 (16)
kt+1 · (1 ¡ ±k)kt + ikt (17)
where ¼Ft is the discounted stream of pro¯ts for the typical ¯rm; and, ½t is the subjective discount factor
used by the ¯rms. Note that the loan constraint, equation (16), implies that from the ¯rm's point of view,
8it may as well be renting the capital from the bank itself. Moreover, the loans are strictly one period loans.
Because of these assumptions, as pointed out by Chari et al. (1995), the ¯rm can be seen as facing a static
problem. Hence, one of the implications of the equilibrium conditions of this version of the model is that
the choice of ½t is immaterial.
The up-shot of the above static problem of the ¯rm yields the following e±ciency conditions:




(nt) : A(1 ¡ ®)kt = wt (19)
Equation (18) suggests that the production ¯rm sets its marginal product of the capital good equal to the
real rental, while (19), simply states that the ¯rm hires e®ective labor up to the point where the marginal
product of labor equates the real wage. Note, we are using the fact that in equilibrium: nt = 1 and kt = kt
holds.
2.4 Government and the External Sector
In this subsection, we describe the activities of an in¯nitely-lived government. The government purchases
gt units of the consumption good and is assumed to costlessly transform these one-for-one into what are
called \government good". The \government good" is assumed to be useless to the agents. The government
¯nances these purchases by income taxation and printing of ¯at money. Formally, the government's budget
constraint at date t can be de¯ned as follows:
ptgt = ¿tptwt + [Mt ¡ Mt¡1] (20)
where Mt = pt(m1t + m2t): is the total money in circulation in nominal terms. We assume that money
evolves according to the policy rule Mt = (1 + ¹t)Mt¡1, where ¹(>0) is the money growth rate.
Finally, the balance of payments identity of this economy, assuming that (PPP), i.e., p = ep¤ holds for
all t, and that there are no transactions in the capital account, is given by:
xt ¡ c¤
t = 0 (21)
where xt is the export. The identity, given by equation (21), implies that the trade surplus (xt ¡ c¤
t) has
9to be equal to zero. Without any loss of generality and maintaining consistency with perpetual growth, the









t=0, stocks of ¯nancial assets fm1t;m2t;dt;f¤
t ;ltg1
t=0, exogenous sequences of fp¤
tg1
t=0,
and policy variables f¿t;°t;¹tg1
t=0 such that:
² Taking idt, ¿t, wt, et and pt, the consumer optimally chooses ct+1, c¤
t+1, dt, m1t and f¤
t , such that (1)
is maximized subject to (2) and (3);
² The stock of ¯nancial assets, m2t and lt, solve the bank's date{t pro¯t maximization problem, (9),
subject to (10) and (11), given prices and policy variables.
² The real allocations solve the ¯rm's date{t pro¯t maximization problem, (15), subject to (16) and (17),
given prices and policy variables.
² The goods, money, loanable funds, labor and the bond market equilibrium conditions are satis¯ed for
all t ¸ 0.
² The government budget, equation (20), is balanced on a period-by-period basis.
² The equilibrium condition in the external sector requires, equation (22) to holds, along with the PPP
condition being satis¯ed for all t ¸ 0.
² idt, ilt, dt, m1t, m2t, f¤
t , pt = et and p¤
t must be positive for all t ¸ 0.
104 Currency Substitution and Optimal Policy Decisions
In this section, we analyze whether higher degree of currency substitution would result in an increase in the
degree of ¯nancial repression within a speci¯c country. In our case, this implies studying whether the optimal
choice of the reserve-deposit ratio (°t) increases following a decrease in ¸ (the share of domestic currency in
composite money). For this purpose, we analyze the behavior of a social planner who maximizes the utility
of all consumers, by choosing ¿t, °t and ¹t following changes in ¸, subject to the set of inequality constraints:
0 · ¿t · 1, 0 · °t · 1, and ¹t ¸ 0 and also the government budget constraint, equation (20), evaluated at
steady-state. Note for the sake of simplicity, as in Basu (2001), we assume that the social planner follows
time invariant policy rules. Hence, ¿t = ¿, °t = ° and ¹t = ¹.
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(ii) 0 · ¿ · 1 (26)
(iii) ¹ ¸ 0 (27)
(iv) 0 · ° · 1 (28)
where, ­ =
log(Ã1)Ã1+((1¡¸) log(1¡¸)+¸ log(¸))(1¡Ã1¡Ã2)+log(Ã2)Ã2
1¡¯ ; and consistency with endogenous growth,
which requires all real variables to grow at the same rate (µ) in steady-state, allows us to use the fact that
wt = (1+µ)tw0, with w0 being the initial value of the real-wage, and also set: Á =
gt
wt. Further, using (18),
we obtain w0 = A(1 ¡ ®)k0, where k0 is the initial level of per-capita capital stock. Without any loss of







1 + A + ¹ + A®¹ ¡ A¿ + A®¿ ¡ ±k ¡ ¹±k ¡ A° Ã1 + A®° Ã1+










4A (¡1 + ®) (¡1 + °) (1 + ¹) (¡1 + ¿) (1 + A® ¡ ±k) (Ã1 + Ã2)+




The problem of the social planner which comprises of maximizing (24) subject to (25), (26), (27) and
(28), is non-linear in ¿, ¹ and °, and requires numerical values for the parameters of the model to obtain the
optimal values of the policy variables.5 The parameter values, except for the weights of the utility function
(Ã1, Ã2 and (1-Ã1¡Ã2)), has been derived from Zimmermann (1994), Chari et al. (1995), Haslag and Young
(1998), Basu (2001) and Holman and Neanidis (2006). Further, given the parameter values, and alternative
values for Ã1 and Ã2 and, hence, (1-Ã1 ¡ Ã2), we calibrate the values of A required to produce a growth
rate of 2 percent6. The use of alternative values for the parameters de¯ning the weights of the variables
in the utility function is warranted not only since no distinct values for such parameters are available in
the literature, but, more importantly, because this allowed us to check how sensitive our results are to the
choice of Ã1 and Ã2. The chosen and the calibrated parameter values can be categorized into four and are
summarized as follows7:
Preference: Ã1 = 0.70 [0.35], Ã2 = 0.25 (0.10), ¸ = 0.80 and 0.70, ¯ = 0.98;
Production: ® = 0.40, A = 2.94 (4.01) [6.27] , ±k = 0.10;
Policy: ¿ = 0.20, ¹ = 0.15, ° = 0.20; Á = 0.338.
In this regard, it is important to point out that, as is often observed with monetary endogenous growth
models in an overlapping generations framework, we obtained two steady-state growth paths.9 For our
5All the calculations were carried out using the NMaximize routine in Mathematica 5.0.
6The World Development Indicators (published by the World Bank), suggests that the per-capita world growth rate, in
recent times, has tended to vary between 1.5 percent to 2.5 percent. We choose 2 percent, simply as an average of this range.
7It must be pointed out that, for the sake of simplicity and without any loss of generality, we have converted the parameter
values obtained from the ¯ve studies, mentioned above, to their nearest multiple of 5. As long as the framework is retained,
the qualitative results of our analysis continues to hold irrespective of the values chosen for these parameters.
8Note this value of Á ensures a government-size of 20 percent, a ¯gure widely encountered in the literature. See Bhattachary
and Haslag (2001) for further details.
9See Espinosa and Yip (1999) for further details.
12analysis, the negative root, as de¯ned by (29), was chosen, since, for the given parameter values, while
trying to match a growth rate of 2 percent, the positive root yielded a negative value for A, the production
scalar. Hence, the positive root for µ was discarded.
Columns 2, 3 and 4, and 5, 6 and 7 of Table 1 compares the optimal values of the tax-rate (¿¤), the
money growth-rate (¹¤) and the reserve requirement (°¤) respectively, for an increase in the degree of
currency substitution, or more precisely, for a fall in the value of ¸ from 0.80 to 0.70. Note, we repeat the
experiment for alternative values of the parameters de¯ning the weights in the utility function. Speci¯cally,
we start o® with a case where the weight on domestic consumption (Ã1) exceeds the weight on the foreign
consumption (Ã2), which, in turn, is greater than the weight on composite money (1-Ã1 - Ã2). In the second
scenario, we set Ã2 < (1-Ã1 - Ã2) < Ã1, implying that the consumer values aggregate money more than
the foreign consumption, but not more than domestic consumption. Finally, we look, at a situation where,
(1-Ã1 - Ã2) > Ã1 > Ã2, i.e., composite money is valued more than both domestic and foreign consumption,
with the domestic good valued more than the foreign good. Note, we also looked at the above three cases
with Ã2 > Ã1, by switching the weights on Ã1 and Ã2 used above. Understandably, due to the symmetric
nature of the consumer's problem, the corresponding results under the three scenarios, as discussed in Table
1, remained quantitatively unchanged. The results in columns 2, 3 and 4, and 5, 6, and 7, can be visualized
as the changes in optimal policies within an economy for an increase in the degree of currency substitution,
under di®erent weights imposed on the arguments of the utility function. Alternatively, the comparisons of
the results can also be interpreted as the optimal policy decisions of two di®erent economies having exactly
the same parameters, but with the exception of the degree of currency substitution.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
As can be seen from Columns 2, 3 and 4 and 5, 6 and 7 of Table 1, irrespective of the weight assigned
by households on domestic consumption, foreign consumption and composite money. Higher currency sub-
stitution, always leads to higher optimal values of the reserve requirement. Moreover, when the weight on
domestic consumption exceeds the weight on the foreign consumption, which, in turn, is greater than the
weight on composite money, i.e, Ã1 > Ã2 > (1-Ã1 - Ã2) and when (1-Ã1 - Ã2) > Ã1 > Ã2, i.e., composite
13money is valued more than both domestic and foreign consumption, with domestic good valued more than
the foreign good as shown in Row 5 of Table 1, an increase in the degree of currency substitution, causes the
optimal money growth rates to fall but the optimal tax rates to increase. But, when the consumer values
composite money more than the foreign consumption, but not more than domestic consumption, i.e., Ã2 <
(1-Ã1 - Ã2) < Ã1 as depicted in Row 4 of Table 1, we ¯nd that an increase in currency substitution produces
exactly the opposite result to the one obtained above for the money growth rate and taxes. Speci¯cally
speaking, the optimal money growth rate increases, while the optimal tax rate falls. Two aspects of the
results obtained needs to be stressed: First, the optimal money growth rates, under the di®erent situations,
generally tends to be very high. However, such a result is not uncommon in monetary growth models based
on an overlapping generations framework.10 Second, what is more important for our analysis, is the move-
ments of the optimal policy parameters following changes in the degree of currency substitution, rather than
their values per se.11
To check for the robustness of our results, we decided to reduce the value of Á to 0.25, and then to
0.20, implying government-sizes of 15 percent and 12 percent, respectively. In the ¯rst case, we ¯nd that
higher currency substitution now leads to higher ¯nancial repression in two of the three scenarios of weights
discussed above, i.e., for Ã2 < (1-Ã1 - Ã2) < Ã1 and(1-Ã1 - Ã2) > Ã1 > Ã2 holds. When the government
size is reduced further to 12 percent, currency substitution and ¯nancial repression are positively correlated
only when Ã1 > Ã2 > (1-Ã1 - Ã2). So clearly the size of the government matters. For smaller government
sizes, higher currency substitution is always accompanied by higher money growth rates, while the tax rate
remains same, increases and decreases depending, respectively, on whether the consumer values money more
than the consumption goods, one consumption good is valued more than composite money and both the
10For example see were also obtained by Freeman (1987) and Gupta (2005, 2006, 2007). Also refer to Bhattacharya and
Haslag (2001) for a nice exposition as to how this issue can be handled.
11Note, changes in the in°ation tax will tend to change the nominal interest rates, and hence, in turn, a®ect money demand.
So clearly there exists certain trade o® issues here. However, the change in the money demand is an indirect e®ect emerging
from the changes in the rate of in°ation, and would not supercede the change in the in°ation tax rate in itself. In this paper,
we are essentially analyzing the movements of the economy from one steady-state to another and not the transitional dynamics,
thus, the analysis of the movements of the endogenous variables post the change in government policies, following changes in
the degree of currency substitution, has been ignored.
14consumption goods exceed the weight on money. For middle-sized government, when Ã1 > Ã2 > (1-Ã1 - Ã2),
money growth rate falls, while, tax rates increases for a decrease in the value of ±. When Ã2 < (1-Ã1 - Ã2) <
Ã1, higher currency substitution causes both money growth rates and the tax rate to fall, and ¯nally when,
(1-Ã1 - Ã2) > Ã1 > Ã2 money growth rate rises and tax rates fall for an increase in the degree of currency
substitution.
So, as far as the relationship between currency substitution and ¯nancial repression is concerned, we can
draw the following conclusions from the results obtained above:
² Higher currency substitution within a particular economy or across two similar economies (di®ering
only in terms of the share of foreign currency in aggregate money), can cause higher degrees of ¯nancial
repression;
² With bigger sizes of the government, irrespective of how the consumer values domestic and foreign
goods and composite money, higher currency substitution always causes higher ¯nancial repression;
² With mid-sized governments, higher currency substitution can also cause higher ¯nancial repression,
but now the consumer has to value composite money more than at least one kind of consumption good;
² Finally, with governments of relatively small sizes, higher currency substitution and reserve require-
ments are positively related only when the consumer puts more weight on the consumption of domestic
and foreign goods than composite money.
5 Conclusions and Areas of Further Research
This paper, using a general equilibrium overlapping generations monetary endogenous growth model of
a small open economy, analyzes the relationship between currency substitution and ¯nancial repression.
Following other studies in the literature, we de¯ne ¯nancial repression through an obligatory \high" reserve
deposit ratio requirement, that the banks in the economy needs to maintain. In other words, this study
attempts to assay whether currency substitution can provide a rationale for ¯nancial repression. Speci¯cally,
we analyze whether the \high" reserve requirements in a small open economy characterized by currency
15substitution, are a fall out of a welfare maximizing decision of the government, having access to income
taxation and seigniorage as sources of revenue.
We ¯nd that, higher currency substitution within a particular economy or across two similar economies,
di®ering only in the degrees of currency substitution, can cause higher degrees of ¯nancial repression, with
the results depending on the size of the government and what weights the consumer assigns to the domestic
and foreign goods and the composite money. We ¯nd that relatively big-size of the government is both
necessary and su±cient to produce higher ¯nancial repression following an increase in the degree of currency
substitution. For middle-sized government su±ciency requires the consumer to value composite money more
than at least one kind of consumption good, while with smaller-sized government, currency substitution and
¯nancial repression are positively correlated only when the consumer puts more emphasis on the consumption
of domestic and foreign goods than composite money.
A limitation of the existing study, as in Holman and Neanidis (2006), is that it does not endogenize
currency substitution.12 The fact that, currency substitution, mainly arises due to high in°ation, and hence,
should be ideally treated as endogenous, has been ignored in this study. In our economic model, it is as if
to say, that high and continuous in°ation episodes have resulted in a certain steady-state level of currency
substitution for the economy, and, hence, the same can be treated as exogenous. Moreover, endogenizing
currency substitution, would not have allowed us to carry out the existing analysis of optimal policy responses,
following a change in the share of the foreign currency in aggregate money. Once currency substitution is
endogenized, we would, in turn, have to analyze the optimal policy changes following variations in the
structural parameters determining the steady-state level of currency substitution, originating from possibly
high money growth rates. But then, in a welfare maximizing set-up with a government responding to higher
degrees of currency substitution resulting from higher money growth rates, would amount to the government
not being able to use money growth rate as an instrument, simply because further changes in the money
growth rate would now cause the degree of currency substitution to change again. So, in the context of our
current economic environment, the government will now be left with only the reserve requirements and tax
12Gupta (2007) raises similar concerns about studies treating tax evasion as exogenous and analyzing optimal responses of
government policies following changes in the exogenous degree of tax evasion.
16rates as its policy instruments. Nevertheless, this could be an interesting extension. Moreover, it would be
worthwhile to repeat the existing analysis by allowing government expenditures to be productive, along the
lines of Barro (1990).
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19Table 1: Optimal Policy Decisions:
¸ = 0.80 ¸ = 0.70
Scenarios ¿¤ ¹¤ °¤ ¿¤ ¹¤ °¤
(i) Ã1 > Ã2 > (1-Ã1 - Ã2) 30.52 161.06 0.01 30.56 83.20 0.03
(ii) Ã2 < (1-Ã1 - Ã2) < Ã1 2.97 33914.90 18.76 3.65 £ 10¡2 35226.40 23.84
(iii) (1-Ã1 - Ã2) > Ã1 > Ã2 0.00 77775000 1.67 2.26 54428880.00 5.75
(iv) Ã1 > Ã2 > (1-Ã1 - Ã2) 17.59 23172.90 4.00 22.10 5381.94 0.26
(v) Ã2 < (1-Ã1 - Ã2) < Ã1 10.26 58231.70 0.54 0.16 16419.40 13.73
(vi) (1-Ã1 - Ã2) > Ã1 > Ã2 0.01 161.90 2.08£10¡3 0.00 338.65 7.28£10¡5
(vii) Ã1 > Ã2 > (1-Ã1 - Ã2) 16.42 11941.00 0.31 16.92 13292.70 1.21
(viii) Ã2 < (1-Ã1 - Ã2) < Ã1 2.65 32235.80 2.30 6.98 141964.00 0.00
(ix) (1-Ã1 - Ã2) > Ã1 > Ã2 0.00 83.67 0.00 0.00 119.10 0.00
Note: All values are in percentages.
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